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Abstract: The article focuses on the judgment Al Bosco, rendered by the ECJ on 4th October 2018. 
Al Bosco gives a new insight as to how the ECJ interprets the following questions: firstly, it clarifies 
the relationship between the doctrine of extended effects and that of equivalent effects; secondly, it 
underlines the importance of the principle of legal certainty; finally, it addresses issues concerning the 
time limit for the enforcement of a provisional measure issued in a Member State other than the Mem-
ber State in which enforcement is sought. Against such a background, I will examine the pos-sibility of 
introducing a uniform and autonomous concept of harmonized time limits within the EU.
Keywords: Time limits, provisional measures, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and com-mercial matters, civil judicial cooperation, harmonisation.
Riassunto: lo scritto è di commento alla sentenza “Al Bosco”, pronunciata dalla CGUE il 
4 ottobre 2018. L’arresto in parola si segnala per il quid novi introdotto dalla Corte di Lussemburgo 
sull’interpretazione di talune questioni: inizialmente, chiarifica il rapporto tra il principio di estensione 
dell’efficacia e quello di equivalenza degli effetti; sottolinea, quindi, la centralità del principio di legalità 
giuridica. Affronta, da ultimo, talune problematiche relative all’applicazione del termine per l’esecuzione 
di una misura cautelare (un sequestro conservativo) in un contesto transfrontaliero. La sentenza mi for-
nisce lo spunto per svolgere alcune brevi considerazioni circa l’opportunità di valutare l’introduzione di 
un concetto autonomo ed uniforme di termini processuali armonizzati all’interno dell’Unione Europea. 
Parole chiave: termini processuali, misure cautelari, riconoscimento ed esecuzione di decisioni in 
materia civile e commerciale, cooperazione giudiziale in materia civile, armonizzazione. 
Summary: I. Introduction. II. The Al Bosco case. 1. Question referred to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling. 2. The opinion of Advocate General Szpunar. 3. CJEU’s judgment. III. Ensuing 
comments. 1. Doctrine of extended effects vs doctrine of equivalent effects. 2. Legal certainty and 
effectiveness of EU law. 3. The time limit for the enforcement of provi-sional measures in a cross 
border context. A. Consistency in EU law. B. The dies a quo. IV. Potential improvements. 
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Can harmonized time limits in European Civil Procedure enhance the effectiveness...Giovanni Chiapponi
I. Introduction
1. Time limits play a key role in civil litigation. In the past, it was up to the Member States to 
regulate time limits. This led to vastly diverging rules across the European Union. In light of the incre-
asing development of European civil procedural law1, it is thus by no means a surprise that time limits 
have come under increasing scrutiny from the EU legislator.
2. Time limits appear to be a mere technical question, but in fact they raise much broader issues 
that are at the heart of civil procedure. Their role in the development of proceedings is indeed crucial, as 
the activities of parties and judges must often be completed within a definite temporal period. All mo-
dern legal systems establish a precise timeframe to ensure the protection of rights. It follows that parties 
must act within and comply with these time limits. On the one hand, time limits are necessary to ensure 
the structured development of proceedings and to achieve finality of judgments, which are both required 
by the public interest in legal disputes being resolved swiftly, so as not to create a source of uncertainty, 
or unfairness or increased costs of litigation (interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium). However, on the 
other hand it is hard for a party to accept that they have lost a right just because a time limit has elapsed. 
In this regard, it is manifestly unjust to hold a party accountable if they were unable or could not reaso-
nably be expected to exercise their right (assuming that they acted without any fault). 
3. Specifically, conflicting interests underlie time limits provisions: on the one hand, the neces-
sity to respect parties’ rights and, on the other hand, the necessity for legal certainty. All legislation tries 
to strike a fair balance between these interests, improving in such a way the efficiency of proceedings. 
However, how each country has weighed and balanced these interests varies considerably and this factor 
may represent a practical hurdle in cross border proceedings. These differences risk making the exercise 
of a judicial right unequal, preventing the achievement of the objectives put forth by EU instruments. 
Some systems are more rigid as they tend to have one-size-fits-all time limits, while others allow a 
more tailored organisation of deadlines. Consequently, time limits provisions significantly influence the 
development of a trial in its different stages. It follows that the importance of setting reasonable time 
limits is paramount and can hardly be underestimated by the Member States. In that respect, the lack of 
uniformity concerning some time limits may represent an obstacle to the free circulation of judgments in 
the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, hindering, as such, the intention of the European instruments2.
4. Against this backdrop, I will comment on the Al Bosco judgment3, which was rendered by 
the CJEU on 4 October 2018. This decision gives new insight into how the CJEU interprets several is-
sues. Firstly, it clarifies the relationship between the doctrine of extended effects and that of equivalent 
effects; secondly, it underlines the core function of the principle of legal certainty; and finally it addres-
ses the issues concerning time limits for the enforcement of a provisional measure issued in a Member 
1  For a closer look see B. hess, “Harmonized rules and minimum standards in the European law of civil procedure”, 2016, 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/556971/IPOL_IDA(2016)556971_EN.pdf, pp. 5-14; 
B. hess, “The State of the Civil Justice in the Union”, in B. hess, M. BerGstroM, e. storskruBB, EU Civil Justice Current 
Issues and Future Outlook, Hart publishing, 2016, Volume 7, pp.1-23; B. hess, X. kraMer, “From common rules to best 
practices in European Civil Procedure: An introduction”, in B. hess, X. kraMer, From common rules to best practices in 
European Civil Procedure, Studies of the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International and Regulatory Procedural Law, 
Hart Publishing, Nomos, 2017, pp. 9-31; X. kraMer, “Strengthening Civil Justice Cooperation: the Quest for Model Rules and 
Common Minimum Standards of Civil Procedure in Europe”, in M. a. rodriGues  and  h. Zaneti  Jr  (ed.), Repercussões do 
CPC - Processo Internacional, Editora Juspodivm, 2019, pp. 591-606; t. evas, W. van BalleGooiJ, “Common minimum stan-
dards of civil procedure”, November 2019, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/642804/
EPRS_STU(2019)642804_EN.pdf, pp. 1-23. 
2  As shown for instance in B. hess, M. requeJo isidro, F. GasCon inChausti, p. oBerhaMMer, e. storskruBB, G. CuniBerti, 
C. kern, e. WeitZ, X. kraMer, “An evaluation study of national procedural laws and practices in terms of their impact on the 
free circulation of judgments and on the equivalence and effectiveness of the procedural protection of consumers under EU 
consumer law”, https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/531ef49a-9768-11e7-b92d-01aa75ed71a1/
language-en, June 2017, pp. 106-112, pp. 265-269, pp. 296-300.
3  CJEU, 4 October 2018, C-379/17, Società Immobiliare Al Bosco Srl, ECLI:EU:C:2018:806.
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State other than the Member State in which enforcement is sought. More precisely, Al Bosco has been 
adopted in the context of the Brussels I Regulation4, but the main terms of the question are unchanged 
under the regime of the Brussels I bis Regulation5. Thus, in such a context the free circulation of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters is involved.
II. The Al Bosco case 
1. Question referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling
5. Al Bosco involved an Italian property company (Al Bosco) that obtained from an Italian dis-
trict Court (Gorizia) a preventive attachment (freezing) order authorizing it to attach debtor’s movable 
and immovable, tangible and intangible assets. The regional Court of Munich, pursuant to Regulation 
44/2001, declared that preventive attachment order enforceable in Germany. However, the claimant 
applied for its enforcement6 after the time limit of one month, provided under Section 929(2) German 
Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO), had already elapsed. On this ground, the Land Registry attached to 
the Local Court of Munich rejected the application. This rejection was, subsequently, confirmed by the 
Higher Regional Court of Munich. Nevertheless, Al Bosco appealed against the decision on the grounds 
that the time limit for enforcement of the attachment laid down in the law of the Member State in which 
that instrument was issued (Art. 675 Italian Civil Procedure Code7) had been observed. In line with this 
submission, it considered that the time limit in accordance with the law of the Member State where the 
title was declared enforceable (Germany, Section 929(2) ZPO) was not relevant for the enforcement of 
the attachment order. 
6. Thus, with regard to these facts a significant question arose: is it in line with Art. 38(1) Brus-
sels I Regulation8 to apply a time limit for the enforcement of a provisional measure (that of Section 
929(2) ZPO) which is laid down in the law of the State in which enforcement is sought (Germany), to a 
preventive attachment instrument issued in another Member State (Italy) and recognized and declared 
enforceable in the State in which enforcement is sought? Might the German time limit undermine the 
effectiveness of the Brussels I Regulation? 
7. On this basis, the German Federal Court of Justice decided to stay the proceedings and refer 
the question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. 
8. To answer the latter question it is firstly necessary to determine whether the German provision 
of the ZPO (Section 929(2) ZPO) pertains to the enforceability of the order authorizing a preventive 
attachment issued by a court of a Member State other than the Member State in which enforcement is 
sought, or whether that provision comes within the scope of enforcement in the strict sense. It is a subtle 
distinction, but the implications are very relevant. Indeed, according to general principles established 
in Regulation 44/2001 (and in Regulation 1215/2012), in the former case, the law of the Member State 
that delivered the provisional measure (Italy) will apply. Otherwise, the procedural rules of the Member 
State in which enforcement is sought are to apply to matters relating to enforcement, given that neither 
Regulation 44/2001 nor Regulation 1215/2012 have provided for harmonization of enforcement rules. 
4  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1.
5  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2012] OJ L351/1.
6  According to German law a preventive attachment order is enforced through the registration of a debt-securing mortgage 
in the Land Register (Section 932(1) ZPO) within the time limit of one month provided for in Section 929(2) ZPO. 
7  In order to enforce a preventive attachment order Art. 675 Italian Code of Civil Procedure provides for a time limit of 30 
days starting from the rendering of the decision. 
8  Art. 38 states that “a judgment given in a Member State and enforceable in that State shall be enforced in another  Member 
State when, on the application of any interested party, it has been declared enforceable there”. 
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This opposition of views is particularly visible in the disagreement between the opinion of Advocate 
General Szpunar9 and the judgment of the CJEU in the context of the Al Bosco case.
9. Secondly, whether the German time limit is compatible with the objectives laid down in the 
Brussels I and in the Brussels I bis Regulations will be examined. There exists no uniform interpretation 
on this point and this lack of consistency led to dissimilar solutions being proposed by the Advocate 
General and the CJEU.
2. The opinion of Advocate General Szpunar
10. Advocate General Szpunar observed that under German law, a preventive attachment order 
loses legal validity owing to the expiry of a time limit. It follows that the time limit laid down in Section 
929(2) ZPO does not concern enforcement in the strict sense of the lex fori in connection with the enfor-
cement of foreign judgments in Germany, but rather its enforceability10. To classify that provision, Advo-
cate General Szpunar did not take into account its classification under domestic law, but he underlined its 
autonomous nature in the context of EU law. Furthermore, to consolidate this conclusion he pointed out 
that the latter time limit is strictly related to the conditions under which preventive attachment may be 
ordered in Germany. It follows that it cannot be applied in isolation, irrespective of the origin of a judg-
ment for which enforcement is sought11. Consequently, it does not apply to the provisional measure issued 
in Italy and declared enforceable in Germany. In that regard, in order to take into account certain cross-
border aspects of the case in the main proceedings, Advocate General Szpunar affirmed that rights which 
are not granted in the Member State of origin12 should not be granted to a judgment given in one Member 
State, when it is enforced in another Member State (he considered in such a way prevalent the principle 
of extended effects rather than that of equivalent effect). Thus, according to German law, in national si-
tuations, when the German authorities issue a preventive attachment order and then enforce it, a creditor 
who has not observed the time limit provided for in Section 929(2) of the ZPO, may immediately obtain 
another preventive order. However, in a cross border context, where Section 929(2) ZPO applies as a rule 
of the lex fori of the Member State addressed, there is no clear rule as to how the creditor must proceed 
when he has not observed the time limit laid down by that provision. Therefore, according to Advocate 
General Szpunar this lack of clarity and consistency may create a “deadlock”13, which may undermine 
the attainment of the objectives of Regulation 44/2001 and the effectiveness of its provision, preventing 
in such a way the free circulation of judgments in civil and commercial matters
3. CJEU’s judgment 
11. Contrary to Advocate General’s Szpunar opinion, the CJEU stated that the German time 
limit comes within the remit of procedural rules laid down in German law for the enforcement of or-
ders authorizing preventive attachments. It follows that the latter time limit restricts the enforcement of 
a preventive attachment order, but not its validity. On this basis, the CJEU affirmed that it, certainly, 
belongs to the phase of enforcement in the strict sense14. In that regard, the CJEU balanced the relation-
ship between the principle of equivalent effects and that of extended effects in a different way to the 
Advocate General. Indeed, according to settled case-law, once a judgment is incorporated into the legal 
order of the Member State in which enforcement is sought, national legislation of that Member State 
relating to enforcement applies in the same way as to judgments delivered by national courts (principle 
9  Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, 20 June 2018, C-379/1, Società Immobiliare Al Bosco Srl, ECLI:EU:C:2018:472.
10  See paragraph 46 of Advocate General Szpunar’s opinion in Al Bosco.
11  See paragraph 53 of Advocate General Szpunar’s opinion in Al Bosco.
12  See paragraph 63 of Advocate General Szpunar’s opinion in Al Bosco.
13  See paragraph 72 of Advocate General Szpunar’s opinion in Al Bosco.
14  See paragraph 31 and 32 of the Al Bosco judgment.
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of equivalent effects)15. In light of the foregoing, the CJEU affirmed that the time limit laid down in 
Section 929(2) ZPO applied to the Italian provisional measure recognized and declared enforceable in 
Germany. Moreover, in the view of the CJEU the starting point of the analyzed time limit is calculated 
from the date on which the declaration of enforceability was notified to the creditor16. Finally, despite 
Advocate General’s opinion, the CJEU, ensuring respect of legal certainty, observed that attainment of 
the objectives set out in Regulation 44/2001, i.e. to ensure the free circulation of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters within Members States, is not undermined by the application of the time limit laid 
down in Section 929(2) ZPO. Indeed, in the reasoning of the CJEU that time limit affects only the en-
forcement of a title which has already been recognized and declared enforceable. Therefore, Regulation 
44/2001 (and especially Art.38) does not prevent the application of such a time limit.
III. Ensuing comments:
12. In light of the foregoing, I would like to provide some comments that follow from the Al 
Bosco Judgment. 
1. Doctrine of extended effects vs doctrine of equivalent effects 
13. A problematic topic in the solution of this case concerns the legal effects of a decision in 
the law of the Member State where enforcement of a foreign title is sought. Namely, which law should 
be applied for the purpose of determining the scope of a foreign judgment? Which prevails between the 
doctrine of extended effects and that of equivalent effects? 17.
14. Previously, in the Hoffmann case18, the CJEU affirmed that recognition must result in princi-
ple in the conferral on foreign judgments of the same effects and authority accorded to them in the State 
in which they were given. Here, the CJEU adhered to the doctrine of extended effect and that case law 
has been reiterated in its subsequent case law. In contrast, in Apostolides19 the CJEU explored some va-
riations of the doctrine of extension, stating that “there is… no reason for granting to a judgment, when 
it is enforced… effects that a similar judgment given directly in the Member State in which enforcement 
is sought would not have” The CJEU confirmed the above dictum in Prism Investements20 and the EU 
lawmaker in Regulation 1215/2012 (in Art. 41 read in conjunction with Art. 39 and Recital 26), made 
express reference to that statement. Consequently, against such a backdrop, it is reasonable that the 
CJEU, in Al Bosco, excluded the application of Italian law and affirmed that German procedural rules 
(Section 929(2) ZPO) alone were applicable. 
2. Legal certainty and effectiveness of EU law 21
15. Furthermore, the CJEU ensured respect for the principle of legal certainty linked, in the pre-
sent case, on the one hand to the fact that the recovery of an interim measure (related to a requirement 
15  See paragraph 37 and 38 of the Al Bosco judgment.  Furthermore, in the view of the CJEU, this interpretation is borne 
out by recital 26 of Regulation 1215/2012, read in conjunction with Article 39 thereof.
16  See paragraph 50 of the Al Bosco judgment.
17  For further clarifications, see X. kraMer, “The Recognition and Enforcement of Member State Judgment”, in a. diCk-
inson, e. lein, The Brussels I Regulation Recast, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 416, 417. 
18  CJEU, 4 February 1988, C- 145/86, Horst Ludwig Martin Hoffmann v Adelheid Krieg, ECLI:EU:C:1988:61.
19  CJEU, 28 April 2009, C-429/07, Meletis Apostolides v David Charles Orams and Linda Elizabeth Orams, ECLI:EU:C: 
2009:271.
20  CJEU, 13 October 2011, C- 139/10, Prism Investments BV v Jaap Anne van der Meer, ECLI:EU:C:2011:653.
21  In this regard see r. Manko, “Europeanisation of civil procedure: Towards common minimum standards?”, 2015, avail-
able at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_IDA(2015)559499, p.7.; CJEU, 12 Feb-
ruary 2015, C-48/14, European Parliament v Council of the European Union. (Radioactive Water Directive), paragraph 45.
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of urgency) cannot be pursued for an indefinite period of time; and, on the other hand, to the certainty 
of registrations in land registers. In that regard the CJEU considered that the length of the time limit 
(one month), laid down in Section 929 (2) ZPO, complied with EU rules. Indeed, in their reasoning the 
European judges considered the importance of respecting legal certainty and underlined its core function 
for the protection of human rights. Therefore, to disregard legal certainty would entail, in the view of the 
CJEU, the risk of considerably reducing respect for individual’s rights. The necessity to establish a fair 
balance between legal certainty and other EU principles follows. Namely, this was the case in Al Bosco, 
where the CJEU, rightly so,  pointed out that the objective of making the free circulation of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters more effective cannot be achieved at the cost of legal certainty. 
3. The time limit for the enforcement of provisional measures in a cross border context:
A) Consistency in EU law
16. Moreover, in the context of the Al Bosco case, the relevance of Advocate General Szspunar’ 
conclusions which deeply analyzed the conditions and effects that may result from the application of the 
German time limit for the enforcement laid down in Section 929 (2) German Code of Civil Procedure 
to a provisional measure issued in a Member State other than Germany should be underlined. As poin-
ted out above, according to the Advocate General, the application of that time limit is strictly related to 
the requirements under which a preventive attachment may be ordered in Germany. Its application in 
a cross border context would raise some doubts, namely as to how the creditor who did not respect the 
time limit for the enforcement of a preventive attachment order must proceed to obtain a new one. Thus, 
in the Advocate General’s view, that situation of uncertainty may create a deadlock which may prevent 
the free circulation of judgments in civil and commercial matters. Therefore, despite the formalistic 
classification of the CJEU, the impact of the Advocate General’s conclusions cannot be underestimated. 
Indeed, in my opinion it is evident, as it arises from the considerations of Advocate General Szspunar in 
the case at hand, that national provisions on time limits for the enforcement of provisional measures are 
not consistent within EU territory. The fact that the CJEU did not consider a frustration of the objectives 
of the Brussels I Regulation does not solve that issue for the future. A solution characterized by a higher 
level of uniformity is clearly required.
B) The dies a quo 
17. Finally, in this scenario it is important to deal with the question concerning the starting point 
of the time limit for the enforcement of preventive attachment orders in the context of measures delivered 
by the courts of Member States other than the Member State in which enforcement is sought. Thus, in Al 
Bosco, the CJEU explicitly stated that under Regulation 44/2001 the starting point of such a time limit is 
calculated from the date on which the declaration of enforceability was notified to the creditor. However, 
the CJEU did not address that specific issue within Regulation 1215/2012. In that regard, a significant 
issue related to the Brussels I recast arises. Indeed, the Brussels I bis Regulation provided for a new fra-
mework, where exequatur has been abolished and a declaration of enforceability is no longer required in 
the Member State addressed. So, without the decree of exequatur there is no clarity concerning the starting 
day to calculate the dies a quo to lodge an application for enforcement. Will it be calculated according to 
the law of the Member State that issued the decision or according to that in which enforcement is sought? 
Given that on this point there is no settled case law, each State is free to calculate the starting point to 
lodge an application for enforcement according to the lex fori or to the lex causae. In that regard, I think 
that the most reasonable solution, in accordance with the jurisprudence developed under the Brussels I 
Regulation, is to calculate that dies a quo from the date on which the certificate issued pursuant to Art. 
53 Brussels I bis Regulation is served on the person against whom enforcement is sought. However, that 
solution cannot easily be applied everywhere within the EU. For instance in Spain, according to domestic 
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settled case law22 the relevant moment for the mentioned delay to run is the finality of the decision in the 
Member State of origin23. Consequently, which law applies may become an issue potentially leading to 
denial of enforcement of a decision under the regime of the Brussels I bis Regulation. Thus, a frustration 
of the purposes of the latter Regulation may occur, hampering, in such a way, civil judicial cooperation. 
Therefore, this lack of uniformity introduces a source of uncertainty, that can counter the objective of 
simplifying the free circulation of judgments in civil and commercial matters. 
IV. Potential improvements
18. In conclusion, the issues discussed above (namely on the one hand, that concerning the 
application of the time limit laid down in Section 929 (2) German Code of Civil Procedure in a cross-
border context; and on the other that  related to the starting point of the mentioned time limit) illustrate 
negative consequences that may follow from the diversity of national procedural rules on time limits. 
19. In my opinion, a potential solution to overcome complications and failures in the context 
of European procedural law (namely in civil and commercial matters), would be the introduction of an 
autonomous and uniform concept of harmonized time limits within European territory. This could sol-
ve several problems connected with the current fragmented scenario in which each Member State lays 
down its own procedural rules on time limits. I think that the basis for this stronger cooperation may be 
found in the mutual trust that Member States have in the common administration of justice. Namely, the 
legal basis to achieve this goal may be Art. 81 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which 
empowers the EU to enact legislation to improve and guarantee effective access to justice and to elimi-
nate obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceedings. Thus, two possibilities could be envisaged: 
on the one hand, the creation of an autonomous EU instrument, which provides for harmonized rules 
that will, subsequently, apply to other EU instruments (such as for instance the Service Regulation24 or 
the Regulation determining the rules applicable to periods, dates and time limits25); on the other hand, 
the introduction of a specific provision laid down in different Regulations (such as for instance Art. 32 
Brussels I bis Regulation or Art. 4 (4), Art. 5 (3), and Art. 7 Small Claims Regulation26). Through this 
harmonization, the effectiveness of EU law would be strengthened and enhanced, so that its application 
and enforcement would be improved.
22  See Spanish Supreme Court 16-10-2014 (Sala Civil, Sección 1a). 
23  For a closer look on this issue see M.  requeJo isidro, “The Enforcement of Monetary Final Judgments under the Brus-
sels Ibis Regulation (A Critical Assessment)”, in V. Lazić, S. Stuij, Brussels Ibis Regulation Changes and Challenges of the 
Renewed Procedural Scheme, Springer, 2017, pp. 71-97; see also r. arenas GarCia, “Plazo para la ejecución en un Estado 
miembro de una medida cautelar dictada en otro estado”, La Ley Unión Europea, n. 65, 2018, pp. 9,10,11.
24  Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in 
the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters [2007] OJ L324/79.
25  Regulation (ECC, Euratom) No 1182/71 of the Council of 3 June 1971 determining the rules applicable to periods, dates 
and time limits [1971] OJ L124/1.
26  Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a European 
Small Claims Procedure [2007] OJ L199/1.
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